What did Muhammad Ali Jinnah envision for Pakistan, and how closely has the country’s constitutional development followed that vision? These questions formed the basis of a wide-ranging conversation with barrister, writer and Supreme Court advocate Asad Rahim Khan, who teaches constitutional law and Pakistan’s political and constitutional history at LUMS.
Discussing Jinnah’s vision of the state, Khan argued that the historical record does not fit neatly into the categories of either a secular state or a theocracy. He pointed to Jinnah’s opposition to rule by “priests with a divine mission” and his emphasis on freedom of religious expression. According to Khan, pluralism, minority rights and constitutionalism were recurring elements of Jinnah’s political outlook.
The discussion then turned to Pakistan’s early constitutional crises. Khan identified the dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad in 1953 as a major early departure from Jinnah’s constitutional vision. He argued that Jinnah’s adaptation of the Government of India Act 1935 had removed the provision allowing dissolution of the federal assembly, reflecting his view that the Constituent Assembly was sovereign.
Khan also challenged attempts to draw a direct line between Jinnah and the events that culminated in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971. He highlighted the subsequent One Unit scheme, the dismissal of political institutions, martial law and the loss of Bengali numerical representation. He also noted that the Constituent Assembly recognised Bengali as a national language in 1954, with the provision subsequently appearing in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions.
On the 25th Amendment and the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Khan described the abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, extension of fundamental rights and access to the Peshawar High Court as significant changes. At the same time, he argued that the merger’s socioeconomic objectives remained incomplete without the financial resources required for development.
The conversation concluded with the 26th and 27th Amendments. Khan argued that these changes have weakened judicial independence and questioned the creation and functioning of the Federal Constitutional Court. His assessment remains contested: supporters of the new judicial structure have described the FCC as an important institutional development, while critics have raised concerns about judicial independence and constitutional jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the discussion returned to a broader question: how should Pakistan reconcile constitutional reform with representative government, federalism, parliamentary sovereignty and the institutional principles associated with its founding moment?