The army chief says we are in a “hybrid” war with India, which is being used as a justification for extension in his term. Ahmad Faruqui argues as to why the tenures of the air and naval chiefs are not extended if this is the case. Perhaps they are of lesser importance because the issue is not a war with the external enemy but a war for domestic dominance.
The battle has reached the Supreme Court. Regardless of how the case is decided, the issue will not go away. Those supporting the extension base it on the presumption that a state of war exists. But since its birth, Pakistan has always been in a state of a war, real or imagined. Yet many army chiefs have only served for one term. General Raheel Sharif (who succeeded General Kayani), General Mirza Aslam Beg (who succeeded General Zia), General Asif Nawaz (who died in office), and Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan (who succeeded General Yahya) come to mind.
Perhaps this war is more serious than all prior wars. The army chief says we are in a “hybrid” war with India. Then why not also extend the tenures of the air and naval chiefs? Perhaps they are of lesser importance because the issue is not a war with the external enemy but a war for domestic dominance.
That explains why the state of war leads Pakistan to seek an extension of the army chief’s term but does not in India. Most Indian army chiefs have only served for two or three years. Only one or two have enjoyed a four year tenure.
Furthermore, no army chief in India has ever seized the reins of power. The India army only concerns itself with military affairs. In Pakistan, the army runs 50 civilian corporations besides dominating other civilian institutions.
Israel is always in state of war but most army chiefs serve for one term. Israeli generals have never seized the reins of power while they were in office. In retirement, a few have become Prime Minister via elections.
Despite being in a continuous state of war, just about all army chiefs in the US have only served for a single term. Many did not even get to serve a full term if they hit the mandatory retirement age. No military general in the US has ever mounted a coup.
In the Pakistani army, General Zia served as army chief longer than any other. He was appointed in 1976 and died in uniform in 1988. He also ruled the country for those 12 years. No general could have thought of replacing him as army chief without his permission.
General Musa, appointed by General and later President and Field Marshal Ayub, served for 8 years. He was a docile and compliant officer who was appointed for his loyalty. His tenure would have been extended but for the backlash that engulfed Ayub after he failed to seize Kashmir in the 1965 war.
General Yahya replaced Musa in 1966 and was removed from office by the army and the air force in 1971 after he lost the war with India. He had seized power in 1969 and would have undoubtedly continued in office had he won the war.
General Musharraf was appointed in 1998 and seized power in 1999. He served as army chief until 2007, calling the uniform his second skin. He served for a total of 8 years.
General Kayani was appointed as army chief by General Musharraf. His tenure was extended once by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, presumably under duress. Ironically, the extension was opposed by Imran Khan who said extensions degraded the status of the army in the eyes of the people. He also implied that extensions and affected the integrity of the military as an institution. Of course, another issue is that it does a disservice to the other generals who would otherwise have been promoted.
By nominating Bajwa for an extension, while having opposed Kayani’s, Imran Khan has made yet another of those infamous U Turns. Interestingly, what seemed to be a done deal, a formality, has suddenly been challenged at the apex court in the nation. Two issues are at stake. First, did the President of Pakistan approve of the Prime Minister’s decision to extend the tenure of the army chief? And, second, did the Cabinet approve it?
Of course, regardless of whether Bajwa’s term is extended or not, the dominance of the army among the nation’s institutions is likely to go unchallenged.
The army will continue to play the national security card and make sure that the armed race with India continues unabated in both conventional and nuclear weapons. The pursuit of military parity with India will mean that the people of Pakistan will continue to be afflicted with the myriad evils they have had to deal with since their birth: poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor, power outages, and water shortages, just to name a few.
Just about all economists and most anthropologists, psychiatrists, sociologists and political scientists would agree that spending on the social and economic development of its citizens should be a top priority of governments.
This is even truer in developing countries. Hundreds of millions can’t even afford to consume two meals a day. Hundreds of millions don’t have access to safe drinking water, much less to irrigate their crops.
Unfortunately, several of these countries end up spending an inordinate amount of money on their militaries. The problem is acute when neighboring countries have unresolved political disputes. And the problem becomes downright dangerous when they have acquired nuclear weapons.
India and Pakistan epitomize the enigma of overspending on the military. Being the smaller of the two states, Pakistan continues to be steeped in a strategic culture which puts its military security over everything else. Having lost half the country to India in 1971, and having fought two major and several minor wars over the disputed territory of Kashmir without any gains, Pakistan lives in fear of an Indian invasion.
Many would argue that it would not be in India’s interest to invade and occupy Pakistan. It only attacked East Pakistan when millions of refugees spilled over there after the Pakistani army began attacking its Bengali citizens left and right. And it did not occupy Bangladesh. It withdrew its forces.
Some would point to the fact that all prior wars between the two countries have been initiated by Pakistan. But even if one is not persuaded by these arguments about India’s motives and strategic interests, and concludes that Pakistan should be prepared at all times to fend off an all-out Indian invasion, it does not make sense for Pakistan to have a military that’s half of the size of the Indian military.
It should follow the rule of one-thirds put forward by Professor John Mearsheimer. Between forces of comparable quality and firepower, the defender only needs to have a force that is a third as large as the invader.
The battle has reached the Supreme Court. Regardless of how the case is decided, the issue will not go away. Those supporting the extension base it on the presumption that a state of war exists. But since its birth, Pakistan has always been in a state of a war, real or imagined. Yet many army chiefs have only served for one term. General Raheel Sharif (who succeeded General Kayani), General Mirza Aslam Beg (who succeeded General Zia), General Asif Nawaz (who died in office), and Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan (who succeeded General Yahya) come to mind.
Perhaps this war is more serious than all prior wars. The army chief says we are in a “hybrid” war with India. Then why not also extend the tenures of the air and naval chiefs? Perhaps they are of lesser importance because the issue is not a war with the external enemy but a war for domestic dominance.
That explains why the state of war leads Pakistan to seek an extension of the army chief’s term but does not in India. Most Indian army chiefs have only served for two or three years. Only one or two have enjoyed a four year tenure.
Furthermore, no army chief in India has ever seized the reins of power. The India army only concerns itself with military affairs. In Pakistan, the army runs 50 civilian corporations besides dominating other civilian institutions.
Israel is always in state of war but most army chiefs serve for one term. Israeli generals have never seized the reins of power while they were in office. In retirement, a few have become Prime Minister via elections.
Despite being in a continuous state of war, just about all army chiefs in the US have only served for a single term. Many did not even get to serve a full term if they hit the mandatory retirement age. No military general in the US has ever mounted a coup.
In the Pakistani army, General Zia served as army chief longer than any other. He was appointed in 1976 and died in uniform in 1988. He also ruled the country for those 12 years. No general could have thought of replacing him as army chief without his permission.
General Musa, appointed by General and later President and Field Marshal Ayub, served for 8 years. He was a docile and compliant officer who was appointed for his loyalty. His tenure would have been extended but for the backlash that engulfed Ayub after he failed to seize Kashmir in the 1965 war.
General Yahya replaced Musa in 1966 and was removed from office by the army and the air force in 1971 after he lost the war with India. He had seized power in 1969 and would have undoubtedly continued in office had he won the war.
General Musharraf was appointed in 1998 and seized power in 1999. He served as army chief until 2007, calling the uniform his second skin. He served for a total of 8 years.
General Kayani was appointed as army chief by General Musharraf. His tenure was extended once by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, presumably under duress. Ironically, the extension was opposed by Imran Khan who said extensions degraded the status of the army in the eyes of the people. He also implied that extensions and affected the integrity of the military as an institution. Of course, another issue is that it does a disservice to the other generals who would otherwise have been promoted.
By nominating Bajwa for an extension, while having opposed Kayani’s, Imran Khan has made yet another of those infamous U Turns. Interestingly, what seemed to be a done deal, a formality, has suddenly been challenged at the apex court in the nation. Two issues are at stake. First, did the President of Pakistan approve of the Prime Minister’s decision to extend the tenure of the army chief? And, second, did the Cabinet approve it?
Of course, regardless of whether Bajwa’s term is extended or not, the dominance of the army among the nation’s institutions is likely to go unchallenged.
The army will continue to play the national security card and make sure that the armed race with India continues unabated in both conventional and nuclear weapons. The pursuit of military parity with India will mean that the people of Pakistan will continue to be afflicted with the myriad evils they have had to deal with since their birth: poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor, power outages, and water shortages, just to name a few.
Just about all economists and most anthropologists, psychiatrists, sociologists and political scientists would agree that spending on the social and economic development of its citizens should be a top priority of governments.
This is even truer in developing countries. Hundreds of millions can’t even afford to consume two meals a day. Hundreds of millions don’t have access to safe drinking water, much less to irrigate their crops.
Unfortunately, several of these countries end up spending an inordinate amount of money on their militaries. The problem is acute when neighboring countries have unresolved political disputes. And the problem becomes downright dangerous when they have acquired nuclear weapons.
India and Pakistan epitomize the enigma of overspending on the military. Being the smaller of the two states, Pakistan continues to be steeped in a strategic culture which puts its military security over everything else. Having lost half the country to India in 1971, and having fought two major and several minor wars over the disputed territory of Kashmir without any gains, Pakistan lives in fear of an Indian invasion.
Many would argue that it would not be in India’s interest to invade and occupy Pakistan. It only attacked East Pakistan when millions of refugees spilled over there after the Pakistani army began attacking its Bengali citizens left and right. And it did not occupy Bangladesh. It withdrew its forces.
Some would point to the fact that all prior wars between the two countries have been initiated by Pakistan. But even if one is not persuaded by these arguments about India’s motives and strategic interests, and concludes that Pakistan should be prepared at all times to fend off an all-out Indian invasion, it does not make sense for Pakistan to have a military that’s half of the size of the Indian military.
It should follow the rule of one-thirds put forward by Professor John Mearsheimer. Between forces of comparable quality and firepower, the defender only needs to have a force that is a third as large as the invader.