The last thing Pakistani society could endure is a full-fledged ideological conflict. Even if it remains peaceful and restricted to the use of words and arguments, there remains a great chance that it will destroy the remaining social and political fabrics of the society. Even exchange of words, arguments and assertions could be extremely debilitating for the society if it is not taking place within a fairly vibrant, flexible and stable political system.
Stable social and political conditions and liberal intellectual environment is well suited for a vibrant exchange of ideas and debate of conflicting social and political ideas. Absence of liberal intellectual environment could make a debate messy and noisy—and if the debate among conflicting ideas could also lead to political or civil strife than societies could face a very destabilising situation.
Pakistani society has a very poor history of resolving ideological conflicts peacefully or learning from the debate that accompanies such ideological conflicts. We have a history of not giving superior status to reason in an ideological debate and we have a tradition of not keeping the social, political, cultural and economic interests of our society supreme in ideological conflicts.
Instead, we are more adept at use of force and crude power to settle debates that primarily requires exchange of ideas and arguments in a liberal environment.
In our history it often happened that state machinery in general or any institution of the state came forward in the midst of an ideological debate to settle the ideological conflict unfairly in favor of a particular and meagerly represented groups in the representative institutions and thus disrupted an inconclusive ongoing debate.
This often left the impression that it was force and crude power that settled debate in favour of an argument, whose settlement primarily required reason and arguments in a liberal environment.
Right after independence, the Pakistan society faced intense debate between conflicting social and political ideas—the role of religion in the public life of newly born state was not a settled one and therefore there was an intense and lively debate about the role religion, Islam to be precise, would be playing in the political, social, economic and public life of the new society. As Pakistani state was being governed in the initial years on the basis of a borrowed constitution, there was an urgent need to frame a new constitution, which can provide the foundations for the setup of a new political system. Therefore, the question of role of religion in the new state acquired an urgent and significant importance.
The Constituent Assembly had a significant numbers of non-Muslims and even Muslim members who were opposed to assigning central role to Islam in the public policy making in the new state. In the initial years of independence, Constituent Assembly witnessed a lively debate on the role of religion, which remained inclusive and unsettled at the time dismissal of the assembly.
In subsequent years, 1973 constitution assigned a central role to religion in the legislative business of the state by inserting a negative clause that disallowed the enactment of any law, which goes contrary to the injunction of Quran and Sunnah. It appeared that 1973 constitution had settled the issue of role of religion in the public life of the state. But ironically both the conservative clergy and secular oriented intellectual and political forces in the country remained adamantly opposed to the role assigned to religion in 1973 Constitution—while religious conservative criticised the 1973 constitution for not being Islamic enough, the secular minded intellectuals criticised it for being too conservative and retrogressive.
If anybody has any doubts that the question of role of religion in public life is still an unsettled question in Pakistan’s political system, he must recall the events of 1977—the year when major opposition parties violently protested for the implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of Holy Prophet), an epithet for Islamic political system, indicating their dissatisfaction with the existing Islamic provision in the 1973 Constitution.
The events in post-911 Pakistan are a glaring example indicating the unsettled nature of role of religion in Pakistani public life—in this period the Islamic groups started campaigning, through violent means, for the overthrow of the very Constitution of 1973. This indicated that there were groups (and they are armed to the teeth) opposed to the formula devised by Pakistani ruling class to settle the question of role of Islam in Pakistan’s public life.
Pakistan’s traditional ruling classes take solace from the fact that the 1973 Constitution is s consensus document and that the formula that settled the question of role of religion in Pakistan’s political system is part of this consensus document. Till Bhutto era this formula was based on the negative principle that no law contrary to the injunctions of Islam would be enacted in Pakistan.
Zia made substantive amendments in this formula when he made Objective Resolution the substantive and operative part of the constitution and established Islamic courts with the power to strike down any law that is not considered according to the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah by the judges of Federal Shariat Court (FSC).
What I am trying to suggest by citing these examples is the fact that Pakistan has a really bad history of settling ideological debates—as even in the case of Islam, preciously favourite ideology of the country’s ruling classes, the argument is not a settled one. As both at the popular level and within the state machinery, the tussle about defining role of religion in public life has continued as late as the present decade.
And this is not a debate that is going on in a civilised manner with exchange of words, arguments and assertions only. We have witnessed abortive coup (1994 coup attempt) and armed insurgencies—in tribal areas— becoming basis of this debate about possible role of Islam in our public life and state policy-making.
Ideology in itself is not a bad thing, as it radiates light on the otherwise dark path of political and social conflicts in highly fractured society like Pakistan. However, if ideology becomes the basis of social and political strife in the society, instead of familiarizing the masses with new ideas to end exploitation and put an end to ignorance in the society, than there is a problem.
Pakistan has seen enough of civil strife in the past 70 years—four full-scale insurgencies, four coups, at least failed coup attempts and numerous political and social upheavals and agitations.
Two recent events, although small in scale, but indicative of social and political tensions because of ideological conflicts, are not good omens for future of ideological debate in the society. The first is the Marvi-Khalil shooting match on a prime time talk show: this show that we are not civilised enough to conduct a normal and civilised debate in our society. Now the situation has deteriorated to a level where we have two warring camps hurling abuses and threats on each other on social media.
Second event happened on March 8, 2020, in Islamabad when a group of Mullahs pelted stones and bricks on the participants of Aurat March. So much for tolerance: A peaceful, non-violent rally is not digestible for one segment of the society. Can we expect this segment of the society to tolerate a vibrant debate on such vital issues as securing a rightful place for women in our society?
Such an expectation would be meaningless in the face a continuous indicators that religious right only wants to dominate the debate and not engage in any meaningful debate and make adjustments and accommodation according to the latest trends world wide and within our society.